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Abstract—Physical layer security is investigated over mixture
Gamma (MG) distributed fading channels with discrete inputs.
By the Gaussian quadrature rules, closed-form expressions are
derived to characterize the average secrecy rate (ASR) and
secrecy outage probability (SOP), whose accuracy is validated
by numerical simulations. To show more properties of the finite-
alphabet signaling, we perform an asymptotic analysis on the
secrecy metrics in the large limit of the average signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) of the main channel. Leveraging the Mellin
transform, we find that the ASR and SOP converge to some
constants as the average SNR increases and we derive novel
expressions to characterize the rates of convergence. This work
establishes a unified and general analytical framework for the
secrecy performance achieved by discrete inputs.
Index Terms—Discrete inputs, mixture Gamma distribution,
physical layer security, secrecy performance analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, wire-
less communication networks have been suffering from se-
rious information leakage that arises from eavesdropping at-
tacks. Given this backdrop, physical layer security (PLS) has
emerged as an attractive paradigm for secure communication
[1]. In [2], Wyner showed that leveraging a pair of properly
designed encoder-decoder, PLS approach can achieve perfect
secrecy where the eavesdropper cannot obtain any information
about the message dedicated to the legitimate receiver. Hence,
the issue of PLS has received considerable research attention.
Over the past years, secrecy performance analysis over
fading channels has become a hot research focus in area of
PLS, and such an analysis can unveil valuable system design
insights. Specifically, the secrecy performance measurement
metrics including the average secrecy rate (ASR) and secrecy
outage probability (SOP) have been analyzed over the simple
small-scale fading channels, e.g., the Rayleigh [3], Nakagami-
m [4], η-µ [5], and κ-µ [6] models, the large-scale fading
channels, e.g., the M -distributed model [7], the cascaded
fading channels, e.g., the double-Rayleigh model [8], and
C. Ouyang, S. Wu, and H. Yang are with the School of Informa-
tion and Communication Engineering, Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China. E-mail: {DragonAim, thuraya,
yanghong}@bupt.edu.cn.
C. Jiang is with Tsinghua Space Center, Tsinghua University, Bei-
jing 100084, China, and with Beijing National Research Center for
Information Science and Technology, Beijing 100084, China. E-mail:
jchx@tsinghua.edu.cn.
J. Cheng is with the School of Engineering, The University of British
Columbia, Kelowna, BC V1V 1V7, Canada. Email: julian.cheng@ubc.ca.
the composite fading channels, e.g., the Generalized-K (KG)
[9] model. Recently, it was found that the mixture Gamma
distribution (MGD) serves as a general model to characterize
the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of various fading
types [10], including many classical fading distributions, such
as Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, η-µ, κ-µ, and KG. The secrecy
performance over the MGD fading model was studied in [11].
Due to the wide generality of the MGD model, the work in
[11] serves as a generalized framework of [3]–[6], [9].
The derivations in the aforementioned works were based on
the assumption that the transmitter leveraged a Gaussian ran-
dom codebook to encode the secret message [12]. In a nutshell,
these works have laid a solid foundation for understanding the
secrecy risks in the wireless physical layer exploiting Gaussian
inputs. Yet, in practical systems, the symbols in wiretap codes
are taken from a set of discrete finite alphabets, which makes
the input signals non-Gaussian in general [13]. Thus, it makes
more sense to analyze the ASR and SOP of finite input signals.
Yet, research on the PLS under discrete inputs focused more
on the precoding design [13] and the problem of secrecy
performance analysis has received scant attention.
To fill this knowledge gap, this work performs both explicit
and asymptotic analyses to the ASR and SOP achieved by
finite-alphabet signaling. As previously stated, many classical
fading distributions can be characterized by the MGD model.
To establish a unified and general analytical framework for
secrecy performance evaluation over these mixture Gamma
distributed fading channels [10], we take the MGD model
into consideration. For other fading channels where the in-
stantaneous received SNRs cannot be rewritten in terms of
the mixture Gamma distribution such as the M -distributed
[7] and double-Rayleigh [8] fading channels, their secrecy
performance will be analyzed in our future works.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In a classical Alice-Bob-Eve wiretap fading channel [2],
the transmitter (Alice), the legitimate receiver (Bob), and
the eavesdropper (Eve) are all single-antenna devices1. The
received signals at Bob and Eve can be written as
yi = his+ zi, (1)
1We note that the statistics of the singular values in a random matrix with
mixture Gamma distributed elements still remain as open issues, which makes
it challenging to analyze the secrecy performance of multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) channels. Thus, this work considers single-input single-output
(SISO) channels and the MIMO cases will be considered in our future works.
2where zi ∼ CN (0, 1) (i ∈ {B,E}) denote the additive
white Gaussian noises, hi∈C denote the channel gains, and
s denotes the transmitted symbol satisfying E
{
|s|2
}
= 1.
Assume that the transmitted symbols are taken from an M -ary
quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) constellation S with
equal probabilities. Aided with [14], [15], the instantaneous
mutual information over the main and eavesdropper’s channels
can be written as IM (γi) = log2 Me − LM (γi), where
LM (γi) = 1
Mπ
∑M−1
j=0
[∫
C
e−|u−√γisj|2
× log2
(∑M−1
k=0
e−|u−√γisk|2
)
du
]
.
(2)
Here, C represents the complex plane, sj ∈ S denote the
M -QAM symbols, and γi = |hi|2 denote the instantaneous
received SNRs. Generally, LM (·) lacks any close-form ex-
pressions and can be only calculated by methods of numerical
integration [13]. Yet, for the commonly used square M -QAM
signals, a closed-form approximation of LM (γi) is available.
Particularly, for square M -QAM signals, we can obtain [14]
LM (γi) = 2√
Mπ
∑√M−1
j=0
[ ∫ +∞
−∞
e−(u−
√
γipj)
2
× log2
(∑√M−1
k=0
e−(u−
√
γipk)
2
)
du
]
,
(3)
where pj denotes the real part of sj . On the basis of the Gauss-
Hermite quadrature rule [16, eq. (25.4.46)], we have
LM (γi) ≈Lˆ(n)M (γi) =
2√
Mπ
∑√M−1
j=0
∑n
l=1
ωl
× log2
(∑√M−1
k=0
e−(tl+
√
γipjk)
2
)
,
(4)
where pjk = pj−pk; {ωl} and {tl} denote the weight and ab-
scissas factors of the Gauss-Hermite integration. We comment
that a larger value of n yields a higher approximation preci-
sion. By numerical simulation, we find that setting n = 20 can
generally ensure ǫ
(n)
M (γ) ,
∣∣∣LM (γ)− Lˆ(n)M (γ)
∣∣∣ = O (10−5).
Based on [3], the instantaneous secrecy rate is given by
IsM = max {IM (γB)− IM (γE) , 0} (5)
= max {LM (γE)− LM (γB) , 0} . (6)
We consider γi follow the mixture Gamma distribution with
probability density functions (PDFs) and cumulative distribu-
tion functions (CDFs) respectively given by [10]
fi (γi) =
∑Li
l=1
αi,lγ
βi,l−1
i e
−ζi,lγi , γi ≥ 0, (7)
Fi (γi) =
∑Li
l=1
αi,lζ
−βi,l
i,l Υ(βi,l, ζi,lγi) , (8)
where Li, αi,l, βi,l, and ζi,l denote the fading parameters
satisfying
∫ +∞
0
fi (γi) dγi =
∑Li
l=1 αi,lΓ (βi,l)ζ
−βi,l
i,l = 1
[10]; Γ (z) ,
∫∞
0 e
−ttz−1dt is the Gamma function [17, eq.
(8.310.1)]; Υ(a, ρ) ,
∫ ρ
0
ta−1e−tdt is the lower incomplete
Gamma function [17, eq. (8.350.1)]. By [10], the MGD serves
as a general model to characterize the received SNRs of
various types of fading channels and the values of Li, αi,l,
βi,l, and ζi,l depend on the specific target fading type.
III. AVERAGE SECRECY RATE
A. Explicit Analysis
According to [18], IM (γ) is monotone increasing. Conse-
quently, the ASR can be written as
I¯s =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
y
[IM (x)− IM (y)] fB (x) fE (y) dxdy (9)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
y
[LM (y)− LM (x)] fB (x) fE (y) dxdy, (10)
where (10) holds for IM (γ) = log2 Me − LM (γ).
To facilitate the derivation, similar as [9, eq. (6)], we
rewrite (10) as I¯s = I3 − I2 − I1, where I3 =∫ +∞
0 LM (y) fE (y) dy, I2 =
∫ +∞
0 LM (y) fE (y)FB (y) dy,
and I1 =
∫ +∞
0 LM (x) fB (x)FE (x) dx. Then it follows that
I1 =
LB∑
l=1
LE∑
j=1
αB,lαE,j
ζ
βE,j
E,j
∫ ∞
0
LM (x)Υ (βE,j , ζE,jx)
x1−βB,leζB,lx
dx, (11)
I2 =
LB∑
l=1
LE∑
j=1
αB,lαE,j
ζ
βB,l
B,l
∫ ∞
0
LM (y)Υ (βB,l, ζB,ly)
y1−βE,jeζE,jy
dy, (12)
I3 =
∑LE
j=1
αE,j
∫ ∞
0
LM (y) yβE,j−1e−ζE,jydy. (13)
We find that I1, I2, and I3 can be efficiently calculated using
the GaussLaguerre quadrature rule [16, eq. (25.4.45)]. Taken
together, the final result of I¯s is summarized in (14) as follows
I¯s ≈
LE∑
j=1
αE,j
ζ
βE,j
E,j
p∑
q=1
̟qLM
(
τq
ζE,j
)
τβE,j−1q −
LB∑
l=1
LE∑
j=1
αE,j
ζ
βB,l
B,l
× αE,j
ζ
βE,j
E,j
p∑
q=1
̟q
[
LM
(
τq
ζE,j
)
τβE,j−1q Υ
(
βB,l, ζB,l
τq
ζE,j
)
+ LM
(
τq
ζB,l
)
τ
βB,l−1
q Υ
(
βE,j , ζE,j
τq
ζB,l
)]
= Iˆ(p)s , (14)
where {̟q} and {τq} denote the weight and abscissas factors
of the GaussLaguerre integration. Note that a larger value of p
yields a higher approximation precision. By simulation, setting
p = 30 can generally ensure
∣∣∣I¯s − Iˆ(p)s
∣∣∣ = O (10−8).
B. Asymptotic Analysis
Denote the average SNRs as γ¯i = E
{
|hi|2
}
. The following
section will discuss the asymptotic ASR in high SNR regimes.
Specifically, we set γ¯B to infinity while simultaneously fixing
γ¯E. Before deriving the asymptotic ASR, we rewrite I¯s as
I¯s =
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) [fB (γ)FE (γ) + fE (γ)FB (γ)] dγ
−
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) fE (γ) dγ = −
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) fE (γ) dγ
+
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) d (FB (γ)FE (γ)) = log2M −
∫ ∞
0
FB (γ)
× FE (γ) dIM (γ)−
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) fE (γ) dγ. (15)
3We define Icon ,
∫∞
0
FB (γ)FE (γ) dIM (γ) and Ilim ,
log2M −
∫∞
0 IM (γ) fE (γ) dγ. Note that Ilim can be calcu-
lated by the GaussLaguerre quadrature rule, which yields
Ilim = log2 e +
LE∑
j=1
αE,j
ζ
βE,j
E,j
p∑
q=1
̟qLM
(
τq
ζE,j
)
τβE,j−1q . (16)
Based on [10], limγ¯B→∞ ζB,l = 0 holds, which together with
the fact of limx→0Υ(s, x) = x
s
s
[17, eq. (8.354.1)], yields
lim
γ¯B→∞
FB (γ) =
LB∑
l=1
αB,l
ζ
βB,l
B,l
(ζB,lγ)
βB,l
βB,l
=
LB∑
l=1
αB,l
βB,l
γβB,l . (17)
As explained earlier, the MGD model is proposed to character-
ize several fading distributions and the values of Li, αi,l, βi,l,
ζi,l vary with the target distributions. Fortunately, we find that
regardless of the target fading distributions,
∑LB
l=1
αB,l
βB,l
γβB,l
can be re-expressed as follows
∑LB
l=1
αB,lβ
−1
B,l γ
βB,l =
∑LB
l=1
ΦB,lγ
ΛB,l γ¯
−ΨB,l
B , (18)
where ΛB,l, ΦB,l, ΨB,l are target-distribution-specific con-
stants; ΛB,LB ≥ · · · ≥ ΛB,2 ≥ ΛB,1 > 0, ΦB,l > 0, and
ΨB,LB ≥ · · · ≥ ΨB,2 ≥ ΨB,1 > 0. We comment that (18) can
be directly derived by leveraging the analytical results in [10]
and [15]. Since the derivation is trivial, we omit the detailed
steps here. Additionally,
dIM(γ)
dγ = MMSEM (γ) holds [18],
where MMSEM (·) denotes the minimum mean square error
(MMSE) function of M -QAM. Hence, we obtain
lim
γ¯B→∞
Icon =
∑LB
l=1
ΦB,l
γ¯
ΨB,l
B
∫ ∞
0
γΛB,lFE (γ)MMSEM (γ) dγ
=
∑LB
l=1
ΦB,l
γ¯
ΨB,l
B
M [FE (γ)MMSEM (γ) ; ΛB,l + 1] , (19)
where M [f (t) ; z] , ∫∞0 tz−1f (t) dt denotes the Mellin
transform of f (t). For the sake of brevity, define ΘM,l ,
M [FE (γ)MMSEM (γ) ; ΛB,l + 1]. Specifically, the following
theorem can be found [19]:
Theorem 1. If f (t) is O (ta) as t → 0+ and O (tb) as
t → +∞, then M [f (t) ; z] converges absolutely in the
strip 〈−a,−b〉 or in other words, |M [f (t) ; z]| < ∞ when
−a < ℜ (z) < −b. Here, ℜ (z) denotes the real part of z
Based on [20], we have limγ→0+ FE (γ)MMSEM (γ) = 0
and limγ→∞ FE (γ)MMSEM (γ) = o
(
e−dMγ
)
(dM > 0).
Therefore, FE (γ)MMSEM (γ) is O
(
γk
)
(k > 0) as γ → 0+
and O (xl) (l = −∞) as x → +∞. As stated before,
ΛB,l > 0; thus, ℜ (ΛB,l + 1) ∈ (−k,−l), which together
with Theorem 1, yields |ΘM,l| < ∞. Moreover, by [18],
MMSEM (γ) > 0, which yields ΘM,l > 0. In summary,
∀l ∈ [1, LB], ΘM,l ∈ (0,+∞) and ΘM,l can be calculated
by methods of numerical integration. Hence, we obtain
limγ¯B→∞ Icon = Ga,B,M γ¯−Gd,BB + o
(
γ¯
−Gd,B
B
)
, (20)
where Ga,B,M =
∑
ΨB,l=ΨB,1
ΘM,lΦB,l > 0 and Gd,B =
ΨB,1 > 0; o (·) denotes the higher order term. Consequently,
the asymptotic ASR can be written as
I¯∞s = Ilim −Ga,B,M γ¯−Gd,BB + o
(
γ¯
−Gd,B
B
)
. (21)
Based on (21), the ASR converges to Ilim as γ¯B → ∞ and
the rate of convergence (ROC) is determined by Ga,B,M and
Gd,B. Besides, it can be concluded from (21) that the secrecy
diversity order (SDO) is Gd,B = ΨB,1. Actually, the fact of
limγ¯B→∞ I¯s = Ilim was observed in [13] and the references
therein, but the ROC of I¯s has not been investigated in prior
works. Last but not least, aided with [10], [15], we obtain
limγ¯i→∞ fi (γi) =
∑Li
l=1 Φi,lΛi,lγ
Λi,l−1
i γ¯
−Ψi,l
i . Based on this
and (18), the asymptotic ASR when both γ¯B and γ¯E approach
infinity can be also characterized. Since the derivations are
similar as those above, the details are left to our future work.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
A. Explicit Analysis
The SOP is defined as the probability when the instanta-
neous secrecy rate is lower than a preset value Rs > 0, and it
is written as P (Rs) = Pr (IsM < Rs). By (5), when γB < γE,
IsM = 0 < Rs; thus, P (Rs) can be further written as
P (Rs) = Pr (IsM < Rs, γB > γE) + Pr (γB < γE) . (22)
Define HM , I−1M (log2M −Rs) and FM (γ) ,
I−1M (Rs + IM (γ)), where I−1M (·) denotes the inverse func-
tion of IM (·). Though I−1M (·) lacks an explicit expression,
its value can be found via a simple bisection search. Then, the
following theorem can be found:
Theorem 2. The SOP with discrete inputs is given by
P (Rs) = 1−FE (HM )+
∫ HM
0
FB (FM (y)) fE (y) dy. (23)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
Substituting (7) and (8) into (23) gives
P (Rs) = 1−
LE∑
l=1
αE,l
ζ
βE,l
E,l
Υ(βE,l, ζE,lHM ) +
LB∑
q=1
LE∑
j=1
αB,qαE,j
ζ
βB,q
B,q
×
∫ HM
0
Υ(βB,q, ζB,qFM (y))yβE,j−1e−ζE,jydy. (24)
The integral in (24) can be effectively evaluated by the Gauss-
Legendre quadrature rule [16, eq. (25.4.30)], which yields
P (Rs) ≈ 1−
LE∑
l=1
αE,l
ζ
βE,l
E,l
Υ(βE,l, ζE,lHM ) +
LB∑
q=1
LE∑
j=1
αB,qαE,j
2ζ
βB,q
B,q
×
v∑
i=1
HMϑiΥ
(
βB,q, ζB,qFM
(HM
2 ξi +
HM
2
))
(HM
2 ξi +
HM
2
)1−βE,j
exp
(
HMζE,j
2 (ξi + 1)
) . (25)
Here, {ϑi} and {ξi} denote the weight and abscissas factors
of the Gauss-Legendre integration. Note that a larger value
of v yields a higher approximation precision. We find that
approximately v = 30 is required to achieve 10−7 accuracy.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
Based on (17) and (18), when γ is fixed, limγ¯B→∞ FB (γ) =∑LB
l=1 ΦB,lγ
ΛB,l γ¯
−ΨB,l
B . Thus, as γ¯B →∞, (23) can be written
as P∞out = limγ¯B→∞ P (Rs) = 1−FE (HM )+
∑LB
l=1∆M,l
ΦB,l
γ¯
ΨB,l
B
,
where ∆M,l =
∫HM
0
FΛB,lM (γ) fE (γ) dγ. By using variable
substitution γ → ZM (x) = I−1M (IM (x)−Rs), we obtain
∆M,l =
∫ +∞
I−1
M
(Rs)
xΛB,l
fE (ZM (x))MMSEM (x)
MMSEM (ZM (x)) dx. (26)
4TABLE I
SIMULATIONS PARAMETERS [10]
Distribution Parameter Asymptotic Gd,B
Nakagami-m (m ≥ 0.5) Li = 1, αi,1 = m
mi
i
γ¯
mi
i
Γ(mi)
, βi,1 = mi, ζi,1 =
mi
γ¯i
ΦB,1 =
m
mB−1
B
Γ(mB)
, ΛB,1 = mB, ΨB,1 = mB mB
Hoyt (Nakagami-q) (0 < q < 1)
Li = 20, αi,l = ψ
(
θi,l, βi,l, ζi,l
)
, βi,l = 2l− 1 ΦB,1 = qB+q
−1
B
2
, ΛB,1 = 1, ΨB,1 = 1, 1
ζi,l =
(1+q2i )
2
4q2
i
γ¯i
, θi,l =
(1+q2i )
2qi γ¯iΓ(l)(l−1)!
(
1−q4i
8q2
i
γ¯i
)2l−2
ΨB,LB > · · · > ΨB,2 > ΨB,1 > 0
KG (m > 0, k > 0), m and k Li = 15, αi,l = ψ
(
θi,l, βi,l, ζi,l
)
, βi,l = mi, ΨB,l = ΨB,1 = mB, ΛB,l = ΛB,1 = mB, mB
are distribution shaping parameters λi =
kimi
γ¯i
, ζi,l =
λi
tl
, θi,l =
λ
mi
i
̟lτ
k−m−1
l
Γ(mi)Γ(ki)
LB∑
l=1
ΦB,l =
k
mB
B
m
mB−1
B
Γ(mB)Γ(kB)
LB∑
l=1
̟lτ
kB−mB
κ-µ (κ > 0, µ > 0)
Li = 20, αi,l = ψ
(
θi,l, βi,l, ζi,l
)
, βi,l = µi − 1 + l, ΦB,1 = µ
µB−1
B
(1+κB)
µB
Γ(µB) exp(κBµB)
, ΛB,1 = µB, µB
ζi,l =
µi(1+κi)
γ¯i
, θi,l =
µ
2l+µi−2
i
(1+κi)
µi+l−1κ
l−1
i
eµiκi γ¯
µi+l−1
i
Γ(µi−1+l)(l−1)!
ΨB,LB > · · · > ΨB,2 > ΨB,1 = µB
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Fig. 1. ASR versus γ¯B over Nakagami-m channels for mB = mE = 2.
For simplicity, we define WM (x) , fE(ZM(x))MMSEM (x)MMSEM (ZM(x)) and
KM (x) ,
{ WM (I−1M (Rs)) = 0, 0 < x ≤ I−1M (Rs)
WM (x) , x > I−1M (Rs)
.
Hence, we have ∆M,l = M [KM (x) ; ΛB,l + 1]. Particularly,
the following theorem captures the main result of the asymp-
totic SOP.
Theorem 3. The asymptotic SOP can be written as
P∞out = 1− FE (HM ) +G′a,B,M γ¯−Gd,BB + o
(
γ¯
−Gd,B
B
)
, (27)
where G′a,B,M =
∑
ΨB,l=ΨB,1
∆M,lΦB,l > 0 and Gd,B =
ΨB,1 > 0.
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
The proof in Appendix B suggests that ∆M,l ∈ (0,∞) and
∆M,l can be calculated by the Gauss-Legendre quadrature
rule. Based on (27), we find that the SOP converges to
1 − FE (HM ) as γ¯B → ∞ and the rate of convergence is
determined by Gd,B and G
′
a,B,M . Besides, it can be concluded
from (27) that the secrecy diversity order is Gd,B. We note
that the ASR and SOP yield the same SDO but their ROCs
are different. Following the similar steps as described above,
the asymptotic SOP when both γ¯B and γ¯E approach infinity
can be also discussed, which will be left to our future work.
V. SIMULATION
As explained earlier, the MGD model serves as a general
tool to characterize various types of fading distributions. In
this part, we provide four examples listed in Table I to verify
our former derivations. In Table I, {̟q} and {τq} denote the
weight and abscissas factors of the GaussLaguerre integration
0 10 20 30 40
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
A
SR
 [b
ps
/H
z]
Simulation
Analytical
Limitation
(a) ASR versus γ¯B.
15 20 25 30
10-2
10-1
Simulation
Analytical
Asymptotic
(b) Icon versus γ¯B.
Fig. 2. ASR of 4-QAM versus γ¯B over Hoyt channels for qB = qE =
√
0.5.
and ψ (θi,l, βi,l, ζi,l) =
θi,l
∑Li
j=1 θi,jΓ(βi,j)ζ
−βi,j
i,j
. The simulations
are based on the commonly used square M -QAM signals.
To validate the precision of (14), we plot the ASR over
Nakagami-m fading channels for various modulation schemes
in Fig. 1(a) and compare the analytical results with the
simulated results. The analytical ASR is calculated by (4) and
(14). As stated before, setting n = 20 can generally ensure
ǫ
(n)
M (γ) = O
(
10−5
)
and thus we set n = 20 to approximate
the ASR. Besides, the value of p in (14) is set as 30. As shown,
the analytical results fit well with the simulations. Moreover,
we plot the secrecy rate achieved by Gaussian signaling in
Fig. 1 for comparison. As shown, the ASR of Gaussian inputs
tends to infinity as γ¯B increases, whereas the ASR of discrete
inputs converges to its limitation, namely Ilim, in the large
limit of γ¯B. As discussed in Section III-B, I¯s = Icon + Ilim,
where limγ¯B→∞ Icon = 0 and Ilim is a constant. This means
that the ROC of I¯s equals that of Icon. To show the ROC of
I¯s, we plot Icon versus γ¯B in Fig. 1(b). As shown, in the high
SNR regime, the derived asymptotic results track the numerical
results accurately. Besides, it can be observed that a lower
modulation order yields a faster ROC. Fig. 2(a) plots the ASR
of 4-QAM versus γ¯B over Hoyt channels for selected values
of γ¯E. As shown, the ASR decreases with γ¯E, suggesting the
passive influence of the eavesdropper. Then we use Fig. 2(b)
to illustrate the ROC of the ASR. It can be seen from this
figure that a larger value of γ¯E corresponds to a faster ROC.
In the sequel, we provide some simulation results to verify
the accuracy of (25). Fig. 3(a) compares the analytical and sim-
ulated SOP achieved by M -QAM signals over Generalized-K
(KG) fading channels. The analytical SOP is calculated by
(25), where v is set as 30. As shown, the analytical results
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Fig. 3. SOP of M -QAM versus γ¯B over KG channels for γ¯E = 5 dB,
kB = 5, mB = 2, kE = 2, mE = 1, and Rs = 1 bps/Hz.
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Fig. 4. SOP of 4-QAM versus γ¯B for γ¯E = 0 dB and Rs = 1 bps/Hz. The
main channel undergoes κ-µ fading (κB = 1, µB = 2), while the wiretap
channel respectively undergoes Nakagami-m (mE = 6), KG (kE = 3, mE =
3), and κ-µ (κE = 2, µE = 1) fadings.
match the simulated results perfectly. For reference, the SOP
achieved by Gaussian inputs is also plotted. By [4], the SOP
of Gaussian inputs converges to zero in the large limit of
γ¯B. Yet, as discussed in Section IV-B, the SOP achieved
by discrete inputs converges to a positive constant, namely
1 − FE (HM ), as γ¯B increases, which is consistent with the
results shown in Fig. 3(a). It can be observed from this graph
that a higher modulation order yields a smaller limiting SOP,
which is similar as the observation from Fig. 1(a). Based on
Section IV-B, the rate of P (Rs) converging to 1− FE (HM )
equals the rate of Pcon converging to zero. To show the ROC,
we plot Pcon versus γ¯B in Fig. 3(b). As shown, the derived
asymptotic results accurately characterize the secrecy diversity
order. Furthermore, a higher modulation order yields a slower
ROC, which is consistent with the conclusion drawn from Fig.
1(b). Actually, (25) can be used to evaluate the SOP even
though the main and eavesdropper’s channels undergo different
fading models. An example to verify this has been shown in
Fig. 4, which further validates the correctness of (25).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this letter, leveraging the mathematically tractable form of
the MGD model, we investigated the explicit and asymptotic
secrecy performance of finite input signals over MGD fading
channels. Our study provided novel insights on the wireless
PLS, which may be exploited to guide future system designs.
Besides, this work established a unified and general analytical
framework for evaluating the secrecy issues over wireless
channels driven by finite-alphabet signals when the fading
distributions can be characterized by the MGD model.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: When Rs+IM (γE) ≤ log2M , we find IM (γB)−
IM (γE) < Rs is equivalent to I−1M (Rs + IM (γE)) > γB.
Besides, when Rs + IM (γE) > log2M , we have IM (γB) −
IM (γE) < IM (γB)− log2M +Rs < Rs, which yields IsM <
Rs. Taken together, we obtain Pr (IsM < Rs, γB > γE) =
P1 + P2, where P1 =
∫HM
0
∫ FM(γE)
γE
fB (γB) fE (γE) dγBdγE,
HM = I−1M (log2M −Rs), FM (γ) = I−1M (Rs + IM (γ)),
and P2 =
∫ +∞
HM
∫ +∞
γE
fB (γB) fE (γE) dγBdγE. In addition,
Pr (γB < γE) can be written as Pr (γB < γE) = Z1 +
Z2, where Z1 =
∫HM
0
∫ γE
0 fB (γB) fE (γE) dγBdγE and
Z2 =
∫ +∞
HM
∫ γE
0 fB (γB) fE (γE) dγBdγE. Particularly, we note
that P2 + Z2 =
∫ +∞
HM fE (y)
∫ +∞
0 fB (x) dxdy = 1 −
FE (HM ) and P1 + Z1 =
∫HM
0 fE (y)
∫ FM(y)
0 fB (x) dxdy =∫HM
0
FB (FM (y)) fE (y) dy. As a result, (22) can be written
as P (Rs) = P1 + P2 +Z1 +Z2 = (P1 + Z1) + (P2 + Z2) =
1− FE (HM ) +
∫HM
0 FB (FM (y)) fE (y) dy.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: By [20], we have limx→0+ KM (x) = 0 and
limx→+∞KM (x) = o
(
e−dMx
)
(dM > 0), which together
with Theorem 1, yields |M [KM (x) ; ΛB,l + 1]| < +∞.
Besides, when x > I−1M (Rs), we have WM (x) > 0, which
implies that ∆M,l > 0. Taken together, ∆M,l ∈ (0,+∞).
Hence, the asymptotic SOP can be written as P∞ = 1 −
FE (HM ) + G′a,B,M γ¯−Gd,BB + o
(
γ¯
−Gd,B
B
)
, where G′a,B,M =∑
ΨB,l=ΨB,1
∆M,lΦB,l > 0 and Gd,B = ΨB,1 > 0.
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